Inika Bhasin, BBA LLB, Student, JGLS
Overview of the CCI's Digital Platform Agenda:
The 2026 agenda of CCI (Competition Commission of India) is being driven by digital platforms. This commentary looks at the Apple and WhatsApp matters, why they are significant for Indian start-ups, and how the commission should proceed. Both matters arise under Section 4 of the Competition Act, 2002, which prohibits an enterprise from abusing a dominant position, for instance, through unfair conditions, denial of market access or leveraging one market to protect another. Dominance itself is not illegal; only its abuse is. In the case of Apple, the CCI has determined its App Store payment arrangements to be an abuse of dominance, and WhatsApp has been told to end its coercive data-sharing consent practice.
Significance and Impact on Indian Start-Ups:
The facts stated above are significant for Indian start-ups that rely on dominant platforms for their user base, distribution, and payments. Unfair platform fees reduce their margins, coercive data collection erodes their competitive position, and self-preferencing limits their growth. Together, the terms imposed by a gatekeeper can be the difference between survival and failure for them.
Current Challenges in Enforcement and Appeals:
Enforcement is also now a matter of contestation. Apple is challenging penalties based on global turnover, while on appeal, the CCI’s ₹936 crore fine on Google Play was reduced to about ₹ 216 crore.1
Strategic Recommendations for the CCI:
● Commitment framework: What is required from now on is a combination of firmness and well-crafted commitments. While the CCI is considering Google’s application, it should accept commitments only where they address the root of the competitive harm, and not repeat offenders. Any remedy put in place should have a time limit, be subject to independent oversight, and allow for input from consumer groups and start-ups.
● Timely and robust interventions: In cases where there is clear harm, the Commission should make use of interim relief under Section 33, which allows the CCI to temporarily restrain a party during an inquiry where there is a prima facie contravention and a risk of irreparable harm. It should also set out a penalty methodology robust enough to survive an appeal. Case-by-case action should be aligned with the ex-ante digital competition framework that is on the table.
Conclusion:
Firm enforcement, timely interim relief and carefully monitored commitments offer a workable path. Otherwise, penalties risk becoming a mere cost of doing business for the firms penalised.
https://www.thehindu.com/sci-tech/technology/nclat-reduces-penalty-on-google-to-216-crore-in-play-store-matter/article69389004.ece
(These are the personal views of the author. They do not necessarily reflect the opinion of OP Jindal Global University or its affiliated institutions).
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